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Entrepreneurial market entry through the start-up of new ﬁrms, has generated
a substantial literature. This literature has variously been concerned about
the determinants of market entry (e.g. Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Evans
and Jovanovic, 1989; Fonseca et al., 2001), how the personal characteristics of
latent, novice and habitual entrepreneurs inﬂuence market entry (e.g. Reynolds,
1997; Ucbasaran et al., 2006), as well as how market exit relates to market entry
(e.g. Bosma et al., 2005). However, there has been little formal modelling of
the optimal timing of starting a ﬁrm. Most of this research is empirical, and
approaches entrepreneurship from the point of occupational choice theory. In
practice, the success of new ﬁrms may depend on when they were started. Given
that entrepreneurs will be aware of the importance of the timing of a start-up,
there will clearly be instances where it is valuable for the entrepreneur to wait
before starting up a new ﬁrm.
Although there is little formal modelling of this idea in the entrepreneurship
literature, it has not been completely neglected in the market entry literature,
the notable exception being Dixit (1989) who uses an option pricing approach
to show that when a ﬁrm considers undertaking a project, waiting to do so has
an option value. Later Dixit and Pindyck (1994) developed a formal approach
of investment decision under uncertainty which today is widely used in decision
making. Apart from a large number of contributions on option theory in the
ﬁnance literature, real option theory is presently diﬀusing as a general decision
theory into several ﬁelds of economics and business. Just to mention ﬁelds like
the migration decision1,R & Di n v e s t m e n t s 2, FDI, or cross-border acquisition
and joint ventures decisions3, technology positioning investments4,t h ei m p a c t
of taxes5, and human capital and education decisions6. The major advantage of
this approach is the evaluation of uncertainty and irreversibility of a decision.
In our approach we extend the original Dixit-Pindyck investment model by
including a planning and investment period. We determine the optimal time
to start a new ﬁrm, and the length of the resulting planning and gestation
period, and we providde a detailed analytical discussion of the determinants of
the optimal timing. The role of entrepreneurial ability for entrepreneurship and
learning from experiences can be addressed by looking at serial entrepreneurs
and the eﬀects of learning from experiences on timing of a sequence of market
entry.
1See Burda (1993).
2See e.g. Paxon (2003), Miltersen and Schwartz (2004) and Schwartz (2004).
3See e.g. Rugman and Li (2005) and Gilroy and Lucas (2006).
4See e.g. McGrath (1997).
5See e.g. Niemann (1999), Agliardi (2001), Panteghini (2001) Niemann and Sureth (2004),
or Panteghini and Schjelderup (2005).
6See. e.g. Hogan and Walker (2007), Jacobs (2007).
2The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 we review
the major concepts used in this paper and we highlight the distinction between
novice and serial entrepreneurs. Latent entrepreneurs most often wait before
starting their ﬁrst ﬁrm, or re-starting a next ﬁrm if they had previously owned
a ﬁrm. Some may indeed wait so long that they never get to establish a new or
another ﬁrm. What determines this duration and how can the optimal duration
be established? In section 3 of this paper we provide an answer to this question,
by modelling the decision when to start a ﬁrm as analogous to an investment
decision under uncertainty. For this we propose a real option dynamic program-
ming model which includes the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial ability, which we
will describe in section 4, is an important feature in the modelling of entre-
preneurship. Serial entrepreneurs are distinguished as entrepreneurs with the
beneﬁt of having had the opportunity to learn from their experience and thus
build on their entrepreneurial ability. The paper concludes (in section 5) with a
short summary, a discussion of the policy implications and potential extensions
of the model.
2A R e v i e w o f C o n c e p t s a n d D e ﬁnitions
The Entrepreneur
The formal modelling of the entrepreneur in economics has been complicated
d u et ot h ew i d er a n g eo fv i e w so nt h ed e ﬁnition and concept of entrepreneurship
(Coyne and Leeson, 2004:235). In this paper we therefore proceed by narrowly
deﬁning entrepreneurship as the ‘process of starting and continuing to ex-
pand new businesses ’ (Hart, 2003:5). The role of the entrepreneur in economic
development and structural change is discussed in Naudé (2008) and Gries and
Naudé (2008).
The process of entrepreneurship goes through at least four, but often ﬁve
to six phases. These are the conception phase (when the latent entrepreneur
perceives an opportunity), the gestation phase (when the opportunity is evalu-
ated), the infancy phase (when the ﬁrm is created), and the adolescence phase
(where the ﬁrm matures) (Reynolds 1993). A ﬁfth phase is when the entrepre-
neur exit the market, either voluntary (by selling the ﬁrm or passing it on to
the next generation) or involuntary (when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt), and a sixth
phase is when the entrepreneur starts over - by starting up a new ﬁrm. Not all
entrepreneurs who exit from owning a ﬁrm choose to begin over and start-up a
new ﬁrm, but a sizeable number do. They are known as ‘serial entrepreneurs’,
or ‘renascent entrepreneurs’ (Stam et al. 2007a). In this paper our concern
is with the length of the conception and gestation phases, as applied to both
novice and serial entrepreneurs.
A latent entrepreneur is a person who would prefer to be self-employed
and who is considering seeking or is actively seeking the opportunity (Blanch-
ﬂower et al. 2001:680). In the OECD, about 25 per cent of the labour force
has been found to be latent entrepreneurs (ibid.). Once they are actively trying
to start up a business, they are described as nascent entrepreneurs (Robson
32007:865).
A novice entrepreneur is someone whose current ﬁrm is his or her ﬁrst
start-up. A novice entrepreneur can be contrasted with a serial entrepreneur,
who can be deﬁned as individuals who have ‘sold or closed at least one busi-
ness in which they had a minority or majority ownership stake, and currently
have a minority or majority ownership stake in a single independent business’
(Ucbasaran et al., 2006:5). More generally they are studied under the broader
heading of habitual entrepreneurs, which also includes portfolio entrepre-
neurs (persons who own and operate more than one ﬁrm at the same time).
In this paper however, we conﬁne our attention to the serial entrepreneur and
leave the modeling of portfolio entrepreneurship for a possible future paper.
Sometimes entrepreneurs are also deﬁned or described according to their
reason for having started a ﬁrm. Thus one can distinguish between necessity en-
trepreneurs, evasive entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs. Necessity
entrepreneurs are self-employed because of a lack of suitable wage employ-
ment, evasive entrepreneurs are in business to overcome regulations or avoid
taxes, while opportunity entrepreneurs are self-employed by choice, in order
to exploit some perceived ‘opportunity’ (see e.g. Henrekson 2007; Coyne and
Leeson 2004).
Entrepreneurial ability plays a key role in the market entry decision, and
the subsequent success of a start-up, as we will argue in the next section. As
recognized by Kanniainen and Poutvaara (2007:676) ‘people diﬀer substantially
in terms of their ability to produce a business idea, elaborate their idea, and
make its way to a marketable product or service’. Key entrepreneurial abilities
are the alertness to perceive and act on opportunities (Licht 2007; Gaglio and
Katz 2001), the ability to function under uncertainty and risk (Kihlstrom and
Laﬀont 1979) and the ability to coordinate and manage a ﬁrm (Lucas, 1978).
Given that entrepreneurs deal with uncertainty and irreversibility, real op-
tion theory oﬀers a potentially useful angle from which to approach the market
entry decision. Because future proﬁts of the new ﬁrm are fundamentally un-
certain and determined by the time path of a random process, in this paper
we draw on real option theory to better understanding the optimal timing for
market entry.
Market Entry as Occupational Choice
Since we are concerned to model the start-up (market entry) decision of an
entrepreneur, and to make a distinction between novice and serial entrepreneurs,
it is useful to give a brief overview of the existing literature to show where we
extend and complement this literature.
Economic theory has approached the market-entry decision of an individual
as an occupational choice between self-employment or entrepreneurial activi-
ties, and wage-employment. Important contributions in this regard were made
by amongst others Lucas (1978), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), and Murphy et
al. (1991). Herein and in subsequent research the factors that determine this
occupational choice depend broadly on an individual’s entrepreneurial ability,
4the relative rates of return to entrepreneurship, obstacles such as capital con-
straints and entry (start-up) costs, and factors that inﬂuence the opportunity
costs of becoming self-employed or an entrepreneur. A substantial empirical
literature explores the determinants of market entry and the obstacles faced by
entrepreneurs. In summary, one can distinguish between studies that attempt
to identify macro-level constraints or determinants (e.g. Highﬁeld and Smiley,
1987), those focusing on industry-level and ﬁrm-level constraints (e.g. Reynolds,
1992), on start-up costs and regulatory barriers ( e.g. Fonseca et al., 2007) and
those that attempt to test the predictions from theoretical models on the rela-
tionship between wealth, inequality, credit market constraints and market entry
(e.g. Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000).
In simple terms, the occupational choice can be explained by explicitly in-
corporating entrepreneurial ability (which is often denoted by θ)i n t ot h ep r o -
duction function, as in Murphy et al. (1991):
Q = AθF(L) − w.L (i)
Where Q is output, A is a commonly available technology, F(L) the relation
between output and labour inputs, and w is the wage rate. Because each person
has an entrepreneurial ability (some better than others), it can be shown, gener-
alizing from Murphy et al. (1991) that a person will become an entrepreneur if
proﬁts and the non-pecuniary beneﬁts from self-employment or entrepreneurial
activities exceed wage income plus the additional beneﬁts from being in wage
employment.
(AθF(L(A)) − wL(A)) + η>w L (A)+C (ii)
where η denotes the non-pecuniary beneﬁts of entrepreneurship (following
Blanchﬂower and Oswald 1998) and C start-up (sunk) costs, taxes and other
diverse beneﬁts from wage employment.
Equation (ii) summarizes the key economic determinants of entrepreneurial
start-ups. On the left hand side we ﬁrst ﬁnd entrepreneurial ability (θ). Entre-
preneurial ability is a core element of occupational choice models (e.g. Lucas
1978; Evans and Jovanovic 1989). Because entrepreneurial ability determines
the marginal production from capital and labour (as in equation (i)) the size of
the ﬁrm (proxied by the size L) will be determined by the extent to which the
ability of the entrepreneur can be ‘stretched’ across greater number of employees
(Fonseca et al. 2007).
On the right hand side of (ii) we have wages. Higher relative expected
wages can be expected to lower the probability of an individual opting for self-
employment or entrepreneurial activities. However, empirical research has noted
a ‘paradox’ in that individuals often appear make the occupational choice in
favour of self-employment or entrepreneurial activities when the monetary re-
turns are less than they would have obtained if they had remained in or chosen
wage employment (Hamilton 2000). Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
oﬀer a number of explanations, namely that these individuals have a high tol-
erance for risk, that they may misperceive risk, and are overly optimistic (see
5also Arabsheibani et al. 2000), or that there are large non-pecuniary beneﬁts
(θ in equation (ii)) to being an entrepreneur.
Education and experience have a theoretically ambiguous eﬀect on start-
ups, as it can inﬂuence both θ and w (Giannetti and Simonov 2004). It can
raise the rate of start-ups as it improves entrepreneurial ability (Stam et al.
2007b:7). However it may also reduce the probability of self-employment or
entrepreneurial activities, and raise the probability of ﬁrm exit as it raises the
wage rate that an individual can earn in formal employment. In the context
of serial entrepreneurship it is also been found that more educated persons are
less likely to immediately re-start a new ﬁrm, as they have more opportunities
in the labour market.
Finally, in (ii) we have start-up costs. It includes a ﬁxed cost/sunk cost
element such as planning and preparation, and the regulations that need to
be adhered to in terms of labour and production and organisation standards
(Fonseca et al. 2001). Entry costs and regulations–especially labour market
regulations–tend to lower the start-up rate of new ﬁrms (e.g. Fonseca et al.
2001; Klapper et al. 2006).
In order to overcome start-up costs and investment sunk costs when start-
ing up a new ﬁrm, entrepreneurs generally require access to capital. Following
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) it has been realized that capital markets could provide
inadequate ﬁnance to entrepreneurs due to moral hazard and limited liability
problems (Paulson et al. 2006). The observation that entrepreneurs are wealth-
ier than wage-earners (e.g. Cagetti and De Nardi, 2005) has been taken as
evidence of such capital constraints. Wealthier individuals are not only more
likely to start-up new ﬁrms as wealth allows them to overcome start-up costs,
but also if they need to earn more income in order to achieve similar utility from
their income than less wealthy persons (see Newman, 2007).
The occupational choice model has been applied to both the market entry
decisions of novice and serial entrepreneurs. In the case of serial entrepreneurs
however, there has been a growing number of empirical studies which investi-
gate how the determinants of serial entrepreneurship diﬀer from those of novice
entrepreneurs, what the characteristics of serial entrepreneurs are, and whether
or not serial entrepreneurs perform better than novice entrepreneurs. A good
overview of the current state of the literature on serial entrepreneurs (and more
generally habitual entrepreneurs) is provided by Ucbasaran et al.(2006).
A review of this literature falls outside the scope of the present paper. For
present purposes, it is suﬃcient to note that the fundamental diﬀerences be-
tween serial entrepreneurs and novice entrepreneurs are that the former have
experience, a reputation, and may be older. This might inﬂuence the timing
of their next market entry, depending on the nature of their experience and
reputation. For instance, latent entrepreneurs who have previously successfully
owned and managed a ﬁrm, and voluntarily exited the market, may wait less
longer than novice entrepreneurs before re-entering the market, as they may be
more conﬁdent about their abilities, may be better in handling risk/uncertainty,
may have better established networks, be better able to spot opportunities, be
able to plan more quickly, and because of reputational eﬀects ﬁnd it easier to
6obtain funding. In contrast latent entrepreneurs who have previously owned
and managed a ﬁrm that was ultimately unsuccessful and was forced to exit the
market, may have a longer waiting period as they may want to invest more in
improving their entrepreneurial ability, engage in longer preparation, and may
due to reputational eﬀects and social norms and culture face greater diﬃculty
to obtain funding. In both of these cases age, associated with a shorter planning
horizon, may bring forward the decision to re-enter the market.
The occupational choice approach to market entry as summarised above thus
in essence predicts that entrepreneurial market entry will occur if the beneﬁts
of market entry exceed the costs. The approach has nothing to oﬀer explicitly
on the timing of market entry - it is basically assumed to occur if (ii) is met.
As it assumed that individuals continuously make the assessment of costs and
beneﬁts, diﬀerent times of entry are assumed to reﬂect diﬀerences in individual
circumstances. It does not take into account that when if (ii) is met, it may not
be the optimal time for an individual to enter the market due to uncertainty
of returns. Generally, the occupational choice approach treats uncertainty in
an unsatisfactory manner. It is most often assumed that A.F(L) is certain.
If however, A.F(L) is subject to uncertainty, and there is positive sunk costs
in starting up a ﬁrm, the option to wait before market entry will be valuable.
This is the essence of the approach to market entry and exit pioneered by Dixit
(1989).
Market Entry as Stopping Rule and the Real Option Decision
Dixit (1989) does not explicitly consider entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial
entry, but rather the decision of an existing ﬁr mt oi n v e s to rn o tt oi n v e s ti n
a new project, or to abandon an exiting project. He shows that if the returns
for a risk-neutral ﬁrm of investing in a new project are subject to uncertainty
and there is even a small amount of sunk costs, it will be costly for ﬁrms to
reverse their decision. In such cases the option to wait and see if better returns
can be obtained at a later date, both for ﬁrms contemplating market entry and
exit7, takes on a positive value. Dixit (1989) argues that this option value is
signiﬁcant even if sunk costs are relatively small. As such the start-up of a new
ﬁrm can be modelled by following the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) approach.
Apart from a large number of contributions on option theory in the ﬁnance
literature, real option theory is presently diﬀusing as a general decision theory
into many ﬁelds of economics and business, as we remarked in the introduc-
tion. The major advantage of this approach is the evaluation of uncertainty
and irreversibility of a decision. In this decision problem, time can move in
only one direction (something is irreversibly done or not done with all related
consequences). The decision is made by considering a stochastic dynamic en-
vironment and hence the relevant variables are described by random processes.
Therefore, the approach goes beyond static stochastic decision problems and is
7A ﬁrm with an existing project that is performing unsatisfactorily will often continue with
that project (’hysteresis’) when sunk costs have been incurred, because it would be costly to
re-enter the market if "future developments turn favourable" (Dixit, 1989:629).
7able to model timing decisions8. As the decision problem is explicitly imbedded
in a randomly changing dynamic environment, random changes in the envi-
ronment would inﬂuence original timing decisions. For instance, even if an
entrepreneur had expected to start a new ﬁrm at a particular future date, ran-
dom changes in the environment could trigger - or delay - the start of the ﬁrm.
In general, the approach is appropriate when there is uncertainty, irreversibility
and a problem of optimal timing. As we argue in the next section, uncertainty
and irreversibility are key characteristics of the entrepreneurial market entry
decision. Adding these two elements to the entrepreneurial start-up problem
helps to explain the optimal timing decision when to enter the market.
3 Optimal Timing to Start a Firm
The literature review in the previous section has distilled some of the stylized
facts of what are known about the determinants of market entry of novice and
serial entrepreneurs. It had shown that occupational choice modelling often ab-
stracts from uncertainty and timing of market entry. In this section we propose
a model to address these shortcomings. The market-entry decision at its heart
is not just about the willingness to start a ﬁrm, but about the optimal time to
do so. How long should an idea develop? How much time should be invested
in planning and organizing market entry? When is the best time to enter the
market?
Modelling the optimal timing of these decisions we commence this section
by describing the uncertain future faced by the entrepreneur as consisting of
various patterns of proﬁt streams characterized by diﬀerent stochastic processes
-d i ﬀerent for diﬀering business ideas (products and services) and diﬀerent entry
periods. We then derive a price or proﬁt threshold at which it is optimal for
a latent entrepreneur to conclude the planning and waiting period (gestation)
and enter the market (begin the infancy phase). Knowing this threshold we can
then determine the expected duration of the planning and waiting period.
This optimal timing decision has three elements, namely (i) the accumulated
cost and beneﬁts of planning and waiting, the (ii) value of the ﬁrm (expected
net value of uncertain proﬁts) linked to the quality and nature of the product
or service which the entrepreneur will oﬀer on the market, and (iii) the value
of waiting which includes the possibility of improving the quality and nature
of the product or service, and the value of not being in an irreversible project,
which is the option value of the idea.
3.1 Modelling the start-up decision under uncertainty
(i) Pre-Start-up Planning and Waiting (Conception and Gestation)
Before we turn to an explicit consideration of the speciﬁc conditions of a serial
entrepreneur we start with a more general model of a start-up process. There
8It has also been used to explore timing decisions in education, see Bilkic/Gries/Pilichowski
(2008).
8are often substantial costs to starting up a new ﬁrm (Fonseca et al. 2001;
Klapper et al. 2006). These include the costs required during the conception
and gestation phases of the entrepreneurship process, such as market research,
identiﬁcation and evaluation of opportunities, establishment of networks and
gaining of applicable knowledge. Let Ci represent these costs for a start-up ﬁrm
i in each period. These costs may diﬀer amongst entrepreneurs depending on
their levels of entrepreneurial ability. Thus, at the end of the conception and
gestation period, the same planning activities will have incurred diﬀerent costs
for diﬀerent entrepreneurs. For simplicity these costs are constant for each
start-up ﬁrm9.
Therefore, if we deﬁne the time at which a latent entrepreneur perceives an
opportunity as t =0 , the total investment is the sum of the costs of each period
that the entrepreneur plans and waits until market entry occurs. We can see the
total start-up costs as a sunk investment I(T) which is dynamic: it increases
over time with each additional period of planning and waiting. Denoting the
end of the conception and gestation phase by T, the current value of total sunk




Cer(T−t)dt + ¯ C, (1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate. and ¯ C are the ﬁnal major investments
to realize the market entry. To focus on the major mechanics, taxes or subsidies
are not included. However, this could be easily done by correcting the eﬀective
interest rates r, the costs of preparing10 and the income streams for taxes.
However, waiting and planning also generates beneﬁts. The latent entre-
preneur can observe the market performance of other products and the payoﬀs
of product characteristics and qualities. This will allow him or her to judge the
likely market reward for improving his product or service. Hence, the resources
invested in this phase generate substantial product improvements - or percep-
tions of improvements through marketing and brand-building - which could lead
to an increase in the expected achievable market price and proﬁts. This mech-
anism thus creates a potential link between product innovation and product
branding and entrepreneurial entry, which we leave for future work to model in
greater depth. For the present we can describe the virtual stochastic path of
the pre-start-up market value (price) while investing in an improved product
or service during the conception and gestation phase. In continuous time this
random process can be described as a Brownian motion
d ˜ Pi = δ ˜ Pi + σi ˜ PidW for t<T. (2)
In (2) δ is the expected rate of market reward for a marginal improvement
of the product variety generated during a period of waiting and investing in
9However, with an increasing number of sequential ﬁrms per entrepreneur they may de-
crease for a serial entrepreneur as the entrepreneur beneﬁts from learning by doing.
10If these costs are tax deductible.
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Figure 1: Pre-start-up expected initial market value, and market price dynamics
product improvements. It is the marginal pre-start-up market value diﬀeren-
tial with respect to product quality improvements (see in ﬁgure 1 the expected
time path of the pre-start-up market value given by doted line)11.T h e e x -
pected marginal market reward δ must be suﬃciently large to have a suﬃcient
compensation for the additional investment costs of quality improvement C .
σi denotes a constant volatility, and dW denotes the increments of a standard
Wiener process.
(ii) Value of the Firm
Upon entry into market (t>T) the entrepreneur faces a stochastic revenue
stream which is characterized by an expected average growth rate and elements
of uncertainty. To keep matters simple, we assume that each start-up i is a
price-taker oﬀering a single well-deﬁned product or service. The price of the
product or service, {Pi(t)} can be described by the geometric Brownian motion
dPi = αiPidt + σiPidW for t>T, (3)
with a constant drift αi and a constant volatility σi,w h e r eαi,σi > 0.
dW denotes the increments of a standard Wiener process; and αi describes
the deterministic part of the process. For αi > 0 the price Pi is expected to
grow at the rate αi. Depending on the start-up product i the individual price
proﬁles show diﬀerent growth patterns. As we assume that operating costs are
constant, the price proﬁle will be identical to the revenue and proﬁtp r o ﬁle.
This simpliﬁes matters as we do not need to distinguish further between market
prices, revenues and proﬁts.
11For a formal discussion of the expected market value at market entry time T, see propo-
sition 2.
10The latent entrepreneur is assumed to be aware of the price and revenue
proﬁle of each potential start-up product i. The conception and gestation phase
will come to an end and the entrepreneur will enter the market when a decision
is taken to realize the speciﬁc expected revenue stream {Pi(t)} associated with
a particular start-up product i. In order to derive a rule for the optimal time to
enter the market, we have to determine the expected value of the risky revenue
stream for each potential start-up product i.O n c e a ﬁrm is started up, its
product and service characteristics and hence the revenue proﬁle are ﬁxed. No
other opportunities for business can be chosen and the entrepreneur is locked
in. The economic value of the ﬁrm consists solely of its future revenue. For a
risk neutral entrepreneur the gross value of the start up project V
gross
i is given










with r being the risk-free interest rate as opportunity costs.
For simplicity the entrepreneur has an inﬁnite lifetime12 and does not have
the option of closing or selling his or her ﬁrm.13 Having deﬁned the gross
value of the start-up above, we have to keep in mind that due to planning and
preparation costs during the conception and gestation phase (1), the expected
gross value of the start-up has to be adjusted for sunk investment I(t). Hence,




i − I(T) (4)
(iii) Option Value of Waiting
In addition to the expected net value of the new ﬁrm the third element of the
decision problem, the option value of waiting and not committing to irreversible
decisions has to be considered. This option not to irreversibly take the risk of
failing has its own value - analogous to the investment decision facing a ﬁrm
(Dixit, 1989) or the education decision facing an individual (Hogan and Walker
2007, Jacobs 2007). As long as the latent entrepreneur delays market entry
he retains the option of market entry without the risk of failure and having
to incur sunk investment costs. Waiting may open up additional opportunities
12Obviously the assumption of an inﬁnite lifetime is not realistic. However, often entrepre-
neurs make family decisions. In this case entrepreneurs plan not only for themselves but also
for the next or even more generations ahead. If we had assumed a ﬁnite lifetime, the end of
the investment project would be determined by the end of the physical life of the entrepre-
neur. This date however, is random. While a random jump processes (modeled by Poisson
processes) may address, this it will involve a substantial extension of our model. Since we
wish to keep it simple for now, we leave the relaxation of this assumption for future work.
13Again, it is potentially possible to include exit options such as closing or selling the ﬁrm.
In such a case a potential exit strategy becomes part of the original investment decision.
However, given the additional complexity that this will introduce at this stage, we leave it for
future work.
11which could not have been foreseen and realized otherwise. Since market entry is
regarded as irreversible, another period of waiting may enable the entrepreneur
to obtain more information and reduce the risk of a failure or improve the
market performance of the product. These additional opportunities imply that
it is often beneﬁcial to postpone market entry. Waiting is a value because it
oﬀers the latent entrepreneur ﬂexibility.14 Accounting for the option value F
for the Brownian motion (2), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation holds:
rFdt = E(dF). (5)
This equation indicates that for a time interval dt, the total expected return on
the investment opportunity is equal to the expected rate of capital appreciation.
3.2 Solving the Expected Time of Market Entry
Solving the optimal time of market entry as described above has two steps. First,
for each potential start-up i we need to determine the price (P∗
i (T) threshold)
needed to enter the market. Second, the latent or potential entrepreneur will
continually evaluate the price level. As soon as the threshold is reached, he or
she will enter the market and start up a new ﬁr m .A sl o n ga st h et h r e s h o l di s
not reached the entrepreneur will keep on waiting. As long as the entrepreneur
is waiting he or she will however make a prediction about the expected timing
to enter the market. We will model these aspects in this section.
Decision Problem F o ra ne n t r e p r e n e u rf a c i n gan u m b e ro fp e r i o d so v e rh i s
or her lifetime, the decision whether or not to enter the market consists of
evaluating the three elements introduced above, namely the start-up investment
costs, the uncertainty of revenues and the option value of not entering the
market. Given the expected net value of the new business (4),t h eoption value
Fi of waiting and postponing market entry (and improving the product) can
be determined by applying dynamic programming.15 Once the option value of
waiting has been determined, the question whether or not to wait for another
period will be determined by the solution to:
max{Vi(T),F i(T)} (6)
At any time during the conception and gestation phase the latent entrepreneur
will compare the expected net value of the new ﬁrm with the option value
of remaining outside the market. As long as the option value of postponing
market entry is higher than the value of realizing the uncertain revenue stream,
the latent entrepreneur will opt for another period of waiting/planning. Solving
this continuous decision problem determines the time of entry into the market
14Once the entrepreneur has decided to incur the sunk costs and enter the market, he or
she could also decide to exit if the revenue that is realized is below expectation. However, as
mentioned we assume for simplicitly that the entrepreneur cannot exit the market voluntarily
after entering.
15See the next section.
12and hence the optimal duration of the conception and gestation phase of the
entrepreneurial process.
Determining the Entry Threshold
In order to determine the price that triggers market entry we need to consider
the standard conditions concerning a stochastic dynamic programming problem
of the introduced structure. In addition to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion for the option value Fi and applying Ito’s lemma to dFi,w eh a v et ou s e
the well known boundary conditions, namely (7), the value matching condition
(8), and the smooth pasting condition (9)
Fτ (0) = 0 (7)
Fi (P∗)=V
gross






smooth pasting condition (9)
to solve for the threshold market proce P∗. The setting of the decision
problem implies that the value of the uncertain revenue stream must be worth
the switch from waiting to market entry. Hence, the revenue level implied by
the Brownian motion must be suﬃciently high. This leads us to Proposition 1
as a point of departure:
Proposition 1 For start- up costs of C per period and start-up investment costs
¯ C, a pre-start-up market value following the Brownian motion 2, and a revenue
stream that follows the Brownian motion 3 we can determine the threshold P∗
i (T)































Proof: See Appendix 1.
Since each additional period of waiting increases the total start-up costs,
total sunk investment costs increase over time and hence the entry-threshold
becomes a function of T. To illustrate the threshold and its determinants ﬁgure
2a considers the case of start-up i.I n ﬁgure 2a the horizontal axis represents
time (t) and the vertical axis the natural log of the price (and revenue) level,
Pi. Using logs the exponentially growing threshold (dashed line) can be drawn
as a straight line instead of an exponential curve. In ﬁgure 2a the threshold
curve is increasing over time because waiting is linked to additional product
development and hence costs for improvements of the product. Figure 2a shows
that an additional period of waiting drives up the threshold as the entrepreneur
wants to be compensated for the additional costs by asking for a higher market
price when entering the market.
13Determining the Pre-start-up Expected Market Value
Once the entrepreneur knows from the threshold at which price level he or
she should enter the market, the question is, when will this price threshold be
realized? Waiting and planning results in substantial product improvements
and increasing market rewards described by (2). Hence, we can now conclude
that the pre-start-up market value and revenue from improving the product or
service is an increasing function of the length of the conception and gestation
period. This function can be represented by the pre-start-up market value curve
˜ Pi(T) (dotted line) in ﬁgure 2a16.
Proposition 2 With the pre-start-up Brownian motion 2 we can determine
the time path of the virtual expected pre-start-up value of the product ˜ Pi(T)=
˜ Pi(0)e((δ− 1
2σ2)T+σW(T)), and hence determine the expected initial price for each
duration of the conception and gestation period T.
E ˜ Pi(T)= ˜ Pi(0)eδT. (13)
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Expected Time of Market Entry
The expected time of market entry can now be determined by comparing the
current pre-start-up potential market value with the threshold. With the two
curves, the threshold and the pre-start-up expected market value curve, we can
determine the expected duration of the conception and gestation phase for each
potential start-up i. The conception and gestation phase will end and the next
phase of starting up will commence when the pre-start-up expected market
value (revenue) reaches the threshold, given the present expectations for the
development of the market value (revenue) during the waiting period, and given
expectations about the ﬁrm’s revenue proﬁle.
Proposition 3 a) With the threshold P∗
i (T) and the pre-start-up expected start-
up market value E ˜ Pi(T) (see (2)), and condition (15) and (16) there exists an
optimal time of market entry T∗ = E(T) > 0. b) For each vector (α,r,σ,T∗,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ, ¯ C)
that fulﬁls a) there is a marginal environment, such that T∗ is an implicit func-
tion of α,σ,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ, ¯ C and r.
T ∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Pi(0),δr) (14)
λ
λ − 1
(r − α) ¯ C>˜ Pi(0), (15)
¯ Cr > ¯ Cδ > C0) (16)


















































Figure 2: Threshold and Market Price Development
Proof. See Appendix 3.
In ﬁgure 2a, a higher level of the threshold compared to the pre-start-up
expected market values indicates that the entrepreneurial eﬀorts to develop the
product during the conception and gestation phase (before T∗)a r en o ty e t
suﬃciently compensated by the present market value of the product. Hence he
or she will not yet enter the market. In addition, the project may enter the
market in ﬁnite time only if the slope of the pre-start-up expected market value
curve is higher than the slope of the threshold. Extra time devoted to product
improvements must have a positive net eﬀect compared to the negative eﬀects
of postponing market entry (reﬂected by an increasing threshold). The optimal
time of market entry is reached when the curves intersect and the required entry
threshold is matched by the market value (price) of the product expected to be
realized in the market.
If the market does not reward the costs of additional eﬀorts suﬃciently,
market entry will not happen. This outcome is also illustrated by the dashed
line in ﬁgure 2b. The increasing slope of the threshold curve indicates that
additional time and costs spent on product development and placement must
be compensated by suﬃciently increasing market rewards and hence a rising
expected market price at market entry. In ﬁgure 2b market rewards will not
match the increase in the threshold. As a result there will be no intersect of the
two curves and hence the entrepreneurial idea will not be realized as a start-up.
H o w e v e r ,t h ee x p e c t e dt i m eo fm a r k e te n t r y(T∗) is an indicator of what
might happen in the future. When the conditions of the future are partly
random, unexpected market entry can potentially occur at any time. In ﬁgure 2c
we draw the time path of the pre-start-up expected market value of the product
for the present state of information at time t0 by the dotted line. Consequently,
even if the entrepreneur expects to enter the market at T∗, a randomly occurring
15incident in the market can push the pre-start-up expected market price so that
the threshold is reached and the business should be started immediately. In
ﬁgure 2c this is displayed by the randomly upward shift of the realized market
value at point A0. The observed and hence realized market value exceeds the
threshold at t1 and hence the business is started at t1 and not -as expected
before- at T∗.I t i s e a s y t o ﬁnd illustrative examples for such an unexpected
early market entry If the entrepreneur is targeting a certain market niche, let
us say a shop for high-heel shoes, and suddenly high-heels become fashionable,
the entrepreneur will take the opportunity and immediately open his or her
business. The entrepreneur will take this randomly occurring opportunity at t1
- no matter what he planned and expected before.
This example shows that start-up decisions are timing decisions. Starting a
business means taking the opportunity at the right time, even if the opportunity
occurs accidentally.As the threshold and the pre-start-up expected market value
curve are determined by a number of parameters, in the following section we will
discuss how the optimal time of entry reacts when these diﬀerent parameters
change.
3.3 Determinants of the Expected Time of Market Entry
Having outlined the elements of the optimal start-up time in section 3.1, and
having shown how the optimal time of market entry can be derived in section
3.2, the purpose of this section is to derive some comparative-statics and show
how the model can be used to analyse the eﬀect of various determinants on the
timing of market entry. Without aiming to be exhaustive, we will analyse the
impact of (i) price uncertainty σi and (ii) proﬁtg r o w t hαi, (iii) the path level
of pre-start-up expected market values (revenues) ˜ Pi(0),( i v )s t a r t - u pc o s t sCi,
(v) market rewards δ for improvements in product quality and variety, and (vi)
interest rates r as opportunitiy costs. Figure 3 illustrates the reaction of market
entry when diﬀerent parameters are changing.
(i) Revenue Uncertainty
Proposition 4 With an increase in risk of the future earnings σi expected mar-
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Figure 3: Changes in expected pre-start-up market evaluation
A negative eﬀect of revenue risk - measured by the volatility of revenues
- on the time of market entry is expected. An increasing risk of income will
devalue the earning stream and hence decrease the attractiveness of opening
the business. As long as additional net rewards of a longer phase of product
development can compensate for the increase in the threshold, the project will
still be pursued (see ﬁgure 3a). The increasing risk will shift the threshold curve
upwards and hence will make a later market entry more attractive. Interestingly
enough, this result is obtained even with risk neutral agents. We do not need
to make any assumption about the utility function and risk aversion. The pure
option value and the irreversibility include the eﬀects of σi in a similar way.
If the project becomes too risky there is no intersect in ﬁgure 3a and the
market entry is expected not to take place at all.
(ii) Revenue Growth
Proposition 5 With an increase in the growth rate of the future earnings ex-




















Proof. See Appendix 5
17A change in the revenue growth rate aﬀects the beneﬁts of the new ﬁrm.
Lower revenue growth will decrease the expected present value of the project.
This shifts the threshold curve in ﬁgure 3a upwards and makes a later market
entry more desireable.
(iii) Path Level of Pre-start-up Expected Market Value and Revenue
Proposition 6 A rising level of the pre-start-up expected market value ˜ Pi(0) of











Proof. See Appendix 6
˜ Pi(0) indicates the level of the path of the potential pre-start-up market price
(respectively proﬁt) obtainable for product i when the business is conceptualised
at t =0 . In case of high potential market values of the product the start-up
phase will be shorter. This ﬁnding is intuitive. An increasing potential market
value describes (other things equal including costs) that the product idea earns
more in the market. E.g. ˜ Pi(0) could indicate if the product i is regarded as a
premium or standard product. The higher the expected market evaluation and
h e n c et h el e v e lo ft h ee x p e c t e dp r i c ep a t h ,t h em o r ea t t r a c t i v ei saq u i c km a r k e t
entry. This reaction is also illustrated in ﬁgure 3b. Since an increasing ˜ Pi(0)
leads to an upward shift of the expected market value curve, the threshold is
reached more early and the market entry can be expected to be more rapid.
There is an alternative economic interpretation for ˜ Pi(0).T h ev a r i a b l e˜ Pi(0)
m a yi d e n t i f yt h ee x t r ap r o ﬁts from entrepreneurial activities compared to the
existing wage income. In this interpretation we would include opportunitiy
costs from wage income in our considerations. If a person with a given start-up
idea has high wage income, the level of extra proﬁts would decline compared to
someone with a low wage income. Hence decreasing the extra entrepreneurial
proﬁts above wage income would postphone entrepreneurial activities and reduce
the willingness to start the business.
(iv) Start-Up Costs
Proposition 7 With increasing start-up costs the expected time of market en-

















18Proof. See Appendix 7
As C denotes investment costs for conceptual planning and product devel-
opment, or more general start-up preparation, dT ∗
dC > 0 is the expected reac-
tion. With increasing costs for product development the entrepreneur needs a
compensation from the market. Therefore the required threshold curve shifts
upwards in ﬁgure 3a. As long as the market would reward the outcome of the
additional product improvement suﬃciently enough, both curves would still in-
tersect at a later time. Hence increasing costs for development would postpone
the start-up but not push the idea out of the market. However, this is the most
simple linear case discussed in the proposition. If the marginal market reward
is not suﬃcient (upper dashed line in ﬁgure 3a) increasing costs could make the
project unfeasible. The shift in the threshold cannot be matched by the market
reward and we ﬁnd no intersect. The start-up will not take place.
(v) Rewarding Rate for Product Quality Improvements:
Proposition 8 An increase in the marginal market reward for product improve-
ment is generally ambiguous. However, an increase in δ will tend to speed up
market entry T∗ if
˜ Pi(0)
C becomes suﬃciently large within the limits of conditions






















Proof. See Appendix 8.
Looking at conditon (21) the sign of the reaction depends on the relative
importance of the two terms, i.e., we can identify two diﬀerent eﬀects for the
gestation phase. On the one hand, as preparation and investments in product
development and product improvement generate an increasing market reward,
the virtual market value is approaching a threshold value for market entry more
quickly [ﬁrst term of (21)].
On the other hand, the threshold itself will be aﬀected. Waiting time gener-
ates a higher reward and hence becomes more valueable [second term of (21)].
Depending on these two relative eﬀects we obtain a positive or negative total
eﬀect. Further, as the threshold is - among others - determined by the evalu-
ation of the waiting time, we can see how the real option approach aﬀects the
decision.
(vi) Interest Rate
19Proposition 9 An increase in the interest rate is generally ambiguous. How-
ever, an increase in the interest rate will reduce/increase education (decrease/increase
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Proof. See Appendix 9
As formally discussed in Appendix 9 the reaction is generally ambiguous.
The two terms represent two eﬀects in the decision. The ﬁrst term represents
that the eﬀect of higher costs of borrowing, or opportunity costs, for the in-
vestement during the planning phase must be compensated by the positive price
increase δ generated by the investment. The second term represents the eﬀects
generated by the change of the threshold condition.
4 Modelling Serial Entrepreneurship
In the previous section we derived a framework to determine the optimal timing
of market entry in the case of a novice entrepreneur. In this section we extend
this to the case of a serial entrepreneur. In the case of serial entrepreneurs we
will have a sequence of start-ups. To illustrate the learning eﬀects, we compare
the diﬀerence between project n and n +1 . The timing between start-ups will
depend on the properties of the next intended start-up as well as the fact that
the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur will have been modiﬁed through
the nature of his or her prior business experience. In this section we model how
learning from past experience could aﬀect the start-up timing decision.
As was mentioned, the crucial diﬀerence between novice and serial entrepre-
neurs is in their entrepreneurial ability, which could have been inﬂuenced by the
nature of their prior business experience. In general most parameters are af-
fected by the experience and the outcome of previous entrepreneurial ventures.
The way how these experiences aﬀect future activities may diﬀer among entre-
preneurs and may change with the environmental conditions. However, there
are a number of ways in which an increasing number n of start-up experiences
might aﬀect the timing of start-up decision as modelled in the previous sections.
First, it could reduce preparation and start-up investment costs during the
conception and gestation phase of the next business, i.e. Cn+1 = C(n) with dC/dn <
0. With accumulated experience the entrepreneur knows better how to set up
a ﬁrm. Information costs, costs on market observation and product placement
would be reduced.
Second, it could improve the eﬀectiveness of the entrepreneurs’ start-up in-
vestments in product development and product quality during the gestation
20p h a s e . N o tj u s tc o s tm a yb ea ﬀected by learning, the entrepreneur also may
know better how to develop and improve a product and gain additional market
value, i.e. δn+1 = δ(n) with dδ/dn > 0.
Third, it could contribute to better risk management. A serial entrepre-
neur may be inclined to avoid activities that might lead to a high volatility
of business revenues. As a result the project speciﬁc risk and hence volatility
may decrease with increased entrepreneurial experience and ability i.e. σn+1 =
σi(n) with dσi/dn < 0.
Fourth, it may result in faster rates of business expansion once the new
ﬁrm is started up by the serial entrepreneur. An experienced entrepreneur may
know, how important a rapid market expansion might be and how to succeed
in rapidly penetrating the target market segment. Hence, it can be expected
that the rate of business expansion is a positive function of experience, i.e.
αn+1 = α(n) with dα/dn > 0.
Fifth, being a serial entrepreneur may change his or her ability to obtain
ﬁnance. Whether it improves this ability may depend whether or not the en-
trepreneur has been previously successful or not. Thus the serial entrepre-
neur could either face a higher (as penalty for failure) or lower (reward for
an expected lower personal risk) interest rates for externally raised loans, i.e.
rn+1 = r(n) with dr/dn
> =
< 0.
Sixth, having the beneﬁto fp r e v i o u se x p e r i e n c em a ya ﬀect the level of the
pre-start-up’s expected net market value in various ways. For instance, the level
of the path reﬂects to a certain extend the product niche the entrepreneur is
targeting. Previous experiences may lead to a diﬀerent choice of the market
niche, for e.g. a switch from a standard product to a premium product. In
this case the pre-start-up expected market value would rise, i.e. ˜ Pi(0)n+1 =
Pi(0,n) with d ˜ Pi(0)/dn > 0.
However, we have not yet made a distinction in our model between market
value (price), revenue and proﬁts. We assumed no or ﬁxed operating costs.
Ag i v e no u t p u tr e ﬂects a potential full time occupation the entrepreneur would
devote to his or her business once it is started. Therefore the terms (net) market
value, price, (net) revenue, and proﬁt could be used interchangeable. If the
entrepreneur regards a potential wage from an alternative risk free occupation
as the minimum entrepreneurial income and hence as part of his cost, ˜ Pi(0) is
the net market value of his entrepreneurial activities. Therefore, building up
human capital as in the case of serial entrepreneurship could increase wages
of alternative occupations and decrease the net reward from entrepreneurial
activity. In this case the entrepreneurial experiences from previous projects
would result in a lower personal net market reward of the future entrepreneurial
activity, and i.e. ˜ Pi(0)n+1 = Pi(0,n) with d ˜ Pi(0)/dn < 0. An illustrative
example would be a potential entrepreneur who faces a sudden loss of his job.
In this case he cannot calculate an alternative wage as the opportunity costs
in the revenue and proﬁt process. From his or her subjective perspective the
net value of the start up project would increase. Thus the sudden loss of his
or her job would shift the threshold downwards, triggering an earlier tart of
21entrepreneurial activity.
In ﬁgure 4 we illustrate the eﬀects from previous entrepreneurial experiences
for the duration of a business set up of a serial entrepreneur. Analyzing a
serial entrepreneur allows to study the formation of entrepreneur-speciﬁch u m a n
capital. From a sequence of future entrepreneurial activities we can observe the
learning process and the implications of learning by adjusting the strategy and
the timing of entrepreneurial activities. To keep ﬁg u r e4s i m p l ew ef o c u so n l y
on two potential earning eﬀects, the lower costs for preparation and product
development (dC/dn < 0), and the improved ability of appropriately addressing
the customers needs resulting in a increasing level of the price path of the
product value (d ˜ Pi(0)/dn > 0).
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Figure 4: Learning, and timing of start-ups for a serial entrepreneur
When t0(n) is the time when the idea for project n appeared for the ﬁrst
time we can determine the market entry and hence the duration of the gestation
phase for each project in a sequence of start-up activities. Using the hypothesis
discussed above, ﬁgure 4 shows that for the two eﬀects described, the duration of
planning and conceptual activities will decrease. Generally the learning process
can be expected to speed up market entry for a serial entrepreneur.
However, if an entrepreneur has a damaged reputation due to having failed
in business before, he or she may have to pay higher interest rates when applying
for loans. This penalty may counteract the positive learning eﬀects and may
eventually prevent the latent entrepreneur from starting up a new ﬁrm. More
generally though, the results illustrate the importance of ﬁnancial constraints
22on serial entrepreneurship. There may be many potential serial entrepreneurs
with improved entrepreneurial ability in an economy, particularly in developing
countries, who are prevented from beneﬁtting from their experience by lack of
access to ﬁnance.
Our model is ﬂexible enough to study a number of interesting aspects of
serial entrepreneurship - such as the eﬀect of age on the start-up decision. How-
ever, due to space limitations we leave the illustration hereof, and the further
eloboration of the model, for a future paper.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have shown in this paper that timing matters in the start-up decision of en-
trepreneurs, and how the optimal time to start a new ﬁrm can be determined,
combining real option theory with the occupational choice theory of entrepre-
neurship. We have also shown how the phenomenon of serial entrepreneurship
can be formally modelled in this context, since every novice entrepreneur is po-
tentially a serial entrepreneur, but perhaps never ﬁnds the right time to start
an e x tﬁrm. Using the model derived in this paper we have highlighted that
there is value for a potential entrepreneur to wait before starting a ﬁrm, and
identiﬁed the importance of factors such as entrepreneurial ability, learning, in-
novation, access to ﬁnance and random market events in triggering or stalling
market entry.
Our model has both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically,
we integrated insights from real option theory, used especially in investment
analysis with the theory on entrepreneurial market entry. Moreover, by distin-
guishing between the start-up timing decisions of novice and serial entrepreneurs
we made a speciﬁc contribution to the study of serial entrepreneurship, given
the current lack of formal theoretical models describing the behaviour of serial
entrepreneurs.
Our model may have practical value for reﬁning policies towards start-ups.
This is because the impact of entrepreneurs on economic growth and develop-
ment may depend on entrepreneurs starting their ﬁrms at the optimal time.
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6.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 and Derivatives
of λ
a) The value of the revenue stream is determined by


















b) For the option values Fi the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the




































































This is a second-order homogenous ordinary diﬀerential equation with a free
boundary.










solves the homogenous diﬀerential equation.






i λ(λ − 1) ˜ P
λ−2






σ2Bλ(λ − 1) ˜ Pλ




















σ2 > 1 see (11)
with δ<r see (12)
As ˜ Pi goes to zero, F tends to approach 0. This implies that the negative root
of the characteristic polynomial should have no inﬂuence on F as ˜ Pi tends to
zero.



































































































































































































































































































d) At the investment trigger point P∗
i the value of the option must equal the
net value obtained by exercising it (value of the active project minus sunk cost
of the investment). Hence the following must hold:
30F(P∗
i )=V gross(P∗

































































Besides for I(T) > 0 we have to assume that ¯ C>C
r .
The smooth-pasting condition require st h a tt h et w ov a l u ef u n c t i o n sm e e t
tangentially:
(F(P∗


































































e) With lnI(T) being convex and hence lnP∗
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6.2 Appendix 2: Deriving T and Proof of Proposition 2
a) Development of the initial income level value: The development of
the pre-start-up market value is determined by
d ˜ Pi = δ ˜ Pi + σ ˜ PidW
We put g(x)=l o gx to get the Ito formula for log ˜ Pi(t):

















We obtain after integration










⇔ log ˜ Pi(T)=l o g˜ Pi(0) + (δ −
1
2
σ2)T + σW(T), and hence
˜ Pi(T)= ˜ Pi(0)e((δ− 1
2σ2)T+σW(T)) and hence
E ˜ Pi(T)= ˜ Pi(0)eδT.
∂E ˜ Pi(T)
∂T
= δ ˜ Pi(0)eδT
and lnE ˜ Pi(T) is a linear function in T:























6.3 Appendix 3: Existence of a solution for the expected
time T∗ of market entry, and determination of T∗ as
an implicit function/Proof of Proposition 3:
In general we look for conditions described in ﬁgure 5. The threshold starts
above the initial income curve. For positive T the threshold will have an unique
intersection with the initial value curve from below at A. Hence at the time
of expected market entry denoted by T∗ G = P∗
i (T) − E ˜ Pi(T)=0and the
G−curve has a negative slope dG
dT < 0.
Further, at T∗ the threshold P∗
i (T =0 )must start above the expected
initial income E ˜ Pi(T =0 ) , and G>0 during the pre-market entry period
(0 <t<T∗). Otherwise the market entry would have been taken place.






− δ ˜ Pi(0)eδT∗
< 0 (24)
































































r + ¯ C






































< ¯ C ⇔ C<δ¯ C<r¯ Cs e e16
Before market entry the initial income curve must grow faster than the
threshold curve. Only for a negative slope G can approach and eventually reach
zero. ∂G
∂T < 0 is fulﬁlled if condition ¯ C>C
r (condition 16)
6.3.2 Existence of an intersect of P∗
i (T∗) and E ˜ Pi(T ∗) for positive T∗
a) As the function lnP∗
i (T) is convex if condition (16) holds (see 23) and the
function lnE ˜ Pi(T) is linear, there are at most two intersections. We are inter-
ested only in intersections at T>0. An intersection for positive values of both
functions exsits if condition (15) and (16) holds and G =0for positive values
of T∗.
34G = P∗
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The last inequality is a condition for the axis intercepts of P∗
i and E ˜ Pi. It
guarantees that E ˜ Pi has a lower value in T =0than P∗
i .
P∗







b) Further, in ﬁgure 5 the condition for an intersection and a negative slope
have to hold simultaneously at T∗. We need to show that there is a T∗ were
both dG
dT < 0 and G =0hold. That is, we can ﬁnd a minimum level for ˜ Pi(0)
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(r − α) ¯ Cec
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Finally, ˜ Pi(0) has to lie in the open interval
µ
¯ C λ











366.3.3 c) T∗ as implicit function of various variables: Proof of proposi-
ton 3
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : (i) condition , (15) hold,
(ii) the derivative ∂G
∂T (α,r,σ,T∗,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ, ¯ C) is negative (see condition
(24)) for each vector (α,r,σ,T ∗,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ, ¯ C) and
(iii) the partial derivatives of G by of α,σ,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ, ¯ C and r are continuous
(vide infra), we can apply the implicit function theorem. Hence for a marginal
environment of any vector (α,r,σ,T ∗,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ, ¯ C),T ∗ is an implicit function
of of α,σ,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ, ¯ C and r. q.e.d.
T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ,r, ¯ C)

























































































6.4 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4
To apply comparative statics for the implicit function T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Pi(0),δ r)






(r − α)CerT − δ ˜ Pi(0)eδT T 0
Since we are only interested in values of T∗ described by point A in ﬁgure 5
conditions (15) and ∂G
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(r − α)Ce(r−δ)T − δ ˜ Pi(0)
| {z }
<0 see (24 and 16)
< 0
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<0 see (24 and 16)
C
> 0
6.8 Appendix 8: Proof of Proposition 8
For the derivative with respect to δ and r we need an approximation of I(T) to
examine the sign. We approximate I(T) for the time range between 0 and the
point T∗ by a log linear function with the parameter β denoting the average
growth rate of total accumulated costs between 0 and T∗. Economically this
simpliﬁcation describes an approximation where total costs are payable only at
the end of the education period. The non log linear path of cost accumulation
is proximated as a continous geometric growth process. Therefore we introduce








Note that we approximate a non-linear function (I) with a non-linear growth
rate through a log-linear function which has the same unique positive intersec-
tion with the logarithmized income threshold curve. We consider the shape of
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T=0 =l n¯ C =l nI(0).
As both curves intersect in T = T∗ we can determine a β that satisﬁes the






































i (0) >E˜ Pi(0) and ln( ¯ CeβT
∗
) and lnI(T) s t a r ta tt h es a m ep o i n t ,t h e
corresponding condition for the approximation to (24) is
δ − β>0 (25)




(r − α) ¯ CeβT∗
− ˜ Pi(0)eδT∗
=0




































































40Similar to the derivative of T∗ with respect to r we have to examine under
which condition which summand prevails. Here we assume that the eﬀect of the
option value is dominant.













































































To ﬁnd out if X T 0 we need to follow three steps:
1) Assume a suﬃcient condition for X>0 and X<0: From our
knowledge of the system we assume a suﬃcient condition for an unambigious
sign. It is supposed that
3
8σ2 + 3
2δ>r implies X>0. (26)
3
8σ2 + 3
2δ<r implies X<0. (27)
2) Show that conditon (26) and (27) hold We now show that (26) and
(27) are suﬃcient conditions to obtain an unambigious sign for X:
a) From (26) we obtain λ<3/2 and from (27) we obtain λ>3/2





































































































































we proved that the value of λ depends on
the conditions (26) and (27). Therefore we get
3
2 >λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ>2r (28)
3
2 <λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ<2r (29)

































































































































With the conditions (29) and (28) we know 3
2 >λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ>2r and
3
2 <λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ<2r . Therefore we can check if we ﬁnd true conditions
















































































































































































As we can see there is a feasible combination of δ,σ2, and α satisfying this
condition. The assumption that X>0 and X<0 is proven under the derived
conditions (26) and (27).
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